Central Banks: Hesitant Guardians of Equilibrium

Jerzy Hausner and Andrzej Sławiński ()
Additional contact information
Jerzy Hausner: Cracow University of Economics
Andrzej Sławiński: Warsaw School of Economics

Acta Oeconomica, 2018, vol. 68, issue supplement1, 125-139

Abstract: In our paper we focus on situations when central banks have to conduct monetary policy in a world in which they cannot rely fully on what is regarded the best practice and they have to cope with financial system inherent tendency to be unstable. Both phenomena are rooted in János Kornai’s intellectual heritage highlighting that economy tends to divert from equilibrium and that soft budget constraint erodes economic actors’ behavior.

Keywords: monetary policy; financial stability; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E52 E66 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.akademiai.com/doi/pdf/10.1556/032.2018.68.S.10 (application/pdf)
subscription

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aka:aoecon:v:68:y:2018:i:supplement1:p:125-139

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Akadémiai Kiadó Zrt., P. O. Box 245, H-1519 Budapest, Hungary
https://akjournals.com/

Access Statistics for this article

Acta Oeconomica is currently edited by Mihályi, Péter

More articles in Acta Oeconomica from Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kriston, Orsolya ().