Obvious Manipulations, Stability, and Efficiency in Matching Markets with No, Unitary, and Multiple Contracts: Three Different Results

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Beatriz Millan and Eliana Pepa Risma
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R. Pablo Arribillaga: CONICET/UNSL
Beatriz Millan: CONICET/UNSL/UNSJ
Eliana Pepa Risma: CONICET/UNSL

No 363, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: In two-sided many-to-many matching markets under substitutable preferences —both with and without contracts— all stable-dominating mechanisms are manipulable. In light of this, we examine whether some of these mechanisms are at least not obviously manipulable (NOM). To this end, we discuss three established models that are encompassed by our general framework: the no-contract case, the unitary con tract case, and the multiple-contract case. Our results reveal fundamental differences among the three models. We transition from a no-contracts model, where all stable dominating mechanisms are NOM, to a multiple-contracts model, where all stable mechanisms and all efficient stable-dominating mechanisms are obviously manipulable (OM). In the intermediate case of unitary contracts the doctor-proposing DA mechanism remains NOM, but the hospital-proposing DA mechanism and all efficient stable-dominating mechanisms are OM. These findings reveal fundamental trade-offs between stability, efficiency, and NOM in these markets.

Keywords: obvious manipulations; stability; efficiency; many-to-many matching; contracts. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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