Turnout with Polarization and Campaign Spending

Pau Balart, Agustín Casas, Gerard Doménech-Gironell and Orestis Troumpounis
Additional contact information
Pau Balart: Universitat de les Illes Balears
Agustín Casas: Universidad CUNEF
Gerard Doménech-Gironell: University of Padova
Orestis Troumpounis: Ca Foscari University of Venice

No 371, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: This paper develops a formal model of electoral competition in which parties first choose their platforms and then allocate campaign resources that serve both persuasive and mobilization purposes. Voters, in turn, endogenously sort into ideological and impressionable types. We characterize a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and derive comparative statics that illustrate how the returns to mobilization and persuasion shape equilibrium platforms, campaign spending, and turnout. Among other results, we show that while campaign spending and polarization do not necessarily move in the same direction, turnout consistently increases with polarization.

Keywords: electoral competition; campaign spending; polarization; mobilization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:371

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