Strategic hiding and exploration in networks

Francis Bloch (), Bhaskar Dutta () and Marcin Dziubi´nski ()
Additional contact information
Francis Bloch: Universite´ Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics
Bhaskar Dutta: Ashoka University
Marcin Dziubi´nski: Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw

No 112, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose and study a model of strategic network design and exploration where the hider, subject to a budget constraint restricting the number of links, chooses a connected network and the location of an object. Meanwhile, the seeker, not observing the network and the location of the object, chooses a network exploration strategy starting at a fixed node in the network. The network exploration follows the expanding search paradigm of Alpern and Lidbetter (2013). We obtain a Nash equilibrium and characterize equilibrium payoffs in the case of linking budget allowing for trees only. We also give an upper bound on the expected number of steps needed to find the hider for the case where the linking budget allows for at most one cycle in the network.

Keywords: Network; exploration; networks; Strategic; hiding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2024-04-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper112_0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ash:wpaper:112

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ashoka University ().