Interaction between a strategic mass media firm and a government

Julián Alberto Batista ()
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Julián Alberto Batista: Universidad de San Andrés

Ensayos de Política Económica, 2014, vol. 2, issue 2, 8-25

Abstract: This paper deals with the dynamics between the mass media and the governments of the Latin American states. Although over the past decade the latter have waged «some war» against the former, the paper assures that it is not due to the reasons they claim, but instead it is about economic matters. Therefore a model has been drawn, using the «principal» vs «incumbent» methodology, where a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium will be reached. Apart from the model, the author goes over related literature, and also will conclude by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed model.

Keywords: Media and Elections; Government; Voters; Nash equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:atw:epecon:v:2:y:2014:i:2:p:8-25

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