Term Structure of Loan Commitments in Oligopoly

L-M Granero

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the strategic role of the temporal dimension of loan commitments in a model of competitive banks with imperfect competition in the borrower's industry.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; LOANS; FINANCING; FINANCIAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:359.96

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