Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable
Robert J. Schmidt and
Stefan Trautmann
No 661, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.
Keywords: equality; procedural justice; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04-25
Note: This paper is part of http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/view/schriftenreihen/sr-3.html
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-263678 Frontdoor page on HeiDOK (text/html)
https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver ... tmann_2019_dp661.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Implementing (Un)fair Procedures? Favoritism and Process Fairness when Inequality is Inevitable (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awi:wpaper:0661
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gabi Rauscher ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).