A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

Jesus Marin-Solano and Jorge Navas
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Jorge Navas: Universitat de Barcelona

No 214, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: In Navas and Mar n-Solano (2008) the coincidence between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for a modified version of the differential game model first proposed by Lancaster (1973) was proved. However, important restrictions on the value of the parameters of the model were included, in order to obtain an interior solution. In this paper we extend the previous result, in the limit when the discount rate is equal to zero, by eliminating the restrictions and taking into account corner solutions.

JEL-codes: C73 H21 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2009
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