Bypassing Sanctions: Hide 'N Seek in Tax Havens?

Dominika Langenmayr, Mikayel Tovmasyan and Sebastian Vosseler

No 243, Working Papers from Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)

Abstract: Are sanctions bypassed by hiding money offshore? Using bilateral data on bank deposits, we compare how offshore deposits from sanctioned versus nonsanctioned countries develop after the U.S. and the EU impose financial sanctions. Sanctions targeting individuals increase offshore deposits, as (potential) targets attempt to hide their funds. Broader financial sanctions reduce offshore (and other foreign) deposits, as money is repatriated. A synthetic control case study of Russia following the annexation of Crimea confirms our main findings, showing a 15% post-sanction increase in offshore deposits. These findings highlight the limits of symbolic sanctions and the need for secondary sanctions and financial surveillance.

Keywords: Sanctions; tax havens; illicit financial flows (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 H12 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-pbe
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https://www.bgpe.de/files/2025/09/DP243_final.pdf First version, 2025 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bypassing Sanctions: Hide ‘n Seek in Tax Havens? (2025)
Working Paper: Bypassing Sanctions: Hide 'N Seek in Tax Havens? (2025)
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