Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions

Arup Daripa ()

No 701, Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance from Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics

Abstract: I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.

Keywords: Costly information acquisition; uniform price auction; uninformed bidders; uninformative equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
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https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26904 First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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