Integrity management of e-commerce enterprises from the perspective of co-governance supervision

Jinlong Chen () and Jiayi Hu
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Jinlong Chen: Zhejiang Wanli University
Jiayi Hu: Zhejiang Wanli University

E&M Economics and Management, 2024, vol. 27, issue 3, 135-153

Abstract: The integrity challenges facing e-commerce enterprises are increasingly provoking significant reactions from society. To analyze the dynamic evolution and influence factors of strategies made by the government, e-commerce enterprises, and consumers in different situations, the co-governance supervision of government-e-commerce enterprises-consumers was introduced in this study based on the theory of daily activities. A tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the government, e-commerce enterprises, and consumers was constructed using Matlab for analysis and verification. Results indicate that (1) e-commerce enterprises engage in dishonest practices mainly for additional gains. If the potential benefits obtained are outweighed by the costs of potential sanctions, compensation to consumers, and tarnished reputations under strict government supervision, then e-commerce enterprises are likely to adopt stable integrity management strategies. (2) enhancing government regulation effectiveness and encouraging consumer complaints can significantly reduce the probability of dishonest practices among e-commerce enterprises. (3) increasing government penalties for dishonest practices of e-commerce enterprises, improving government regulations, and engaging in consumers in co-governance by voicing complaints can effectively reduce their motivation for dishonest practices. The conclusions of this study not only enrich the research on integrity management of e-commerce enterprises from the perspective of co-governance supervision, but also provide guidance for curbing dishonest practices by e-commerce enterprises and protecting consumer right.

Keywords: Co-governance supervision; e-commerce enterprise; integrity management; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2024-3-009

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bbl:journl:v:27:y:2024:i:3:p:135-153

DOI: 10.15240/tul/001/2024-3-009

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