Justification for the Pragmatic Conception of Truth in Scientific Pursuit of Knowledge

John Mosu Nzioka, Dynesius Nyangau and Dickson Nkonge Kagema
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John Mosu Nzioka: Department of Humanities, Chuka University, Kenya.
Dynesius Nyangau: Department of Humanities, Chuka University, Kenya.
Dickson Nkonge Kagema: Department of Humanities, Chuka University, Kenya.

International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 2024, vol. 8, issue 8, 659-670

Abstract: Most Scholars in epistemology have always considered the three classical conditions (Belief, Justification and Truth) to be sufficient for knowledge, however, the rise of scientific empiricism has raised doubts in certain circles about the necessity and sufficiency of the truth condition as adopted by scientific inquiry. In particular, arguments have been raised to demonstrate the impossibility of ever achieving truth of things as they are (correspondence), hence, rendering knowledge by empirical methods (which adopt pragmatism as the concept of truth) impossible. This seems a contradiction to our claims that we indeed can know by way of these methods. This paper establishes that despite the fact that we cannot know things as they are, it is possible to have knowledge of the appearance of these things and our perspectives of them. In order to achieve this knowledge, we must firstly revise the nature of the truth condition to make reference to verifiable claims that have a practical value (which work and can be demonstrated and not just abstract standards inaccessible through empirical investigation). As such, our claims to knowledge via empirical means will be sufficiently justified. The research categorically states that knowledge in its proper sense of the term (the correspondence of an idea with the thing it describes) is impossible because human knowledge relies on the senses and these senses acquire data in a subjective manner. As such, we can only understand reality as we perceive it, not as it actually is. The paper concludes by justifying scientific empiricism as a valid source of knowledge because it not only verifies its claims, but also affords room for improvement of beliefs depending on availability of knowledge.

Date: 2024
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