Transparency and accountability as drivers of cultural change. A comparative analysis of central banks and national competent authorities

Mihai-Vasile Cîrja and Jordi Romeu Granados
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Mihai-Vasile Cîrja: Banca Nationala a României
Jordi Romeu Granados: Banco de España

No 2617, Occasional Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: Central banks and financial supervisory authorities make decisions that affect people, markets and the economy as a whole. Although legitimacy and public trust in public institutions generally depend on their ability to explain what they do, why they act and how they can be held to account through transparent and accountable governance, these considerations are especially important for central banks and financial supervisory authorities. Given their independence from day-to-day political direction and the limited direct political oversight to which they are subject, openness, effective communication and meaningful stakeholder participation play a critical role in maintaining their credibility and democratic legitimacy. Building on this premise, this paper examines the role of transparency and accountability in shaping institutional culture, strengthening legitimacy and fostering trust in this type of independent authority. While a substantial body of literature has examined transparency in specific policy areas, particularly monetary policy and financial stability, this paper adopts a broader governance perspective. It explores how national central banks and national competent authorities promote openness, communicate with stakeholders and the wider public and remain accountable in their day-to-day activities. In this context, transparency is understood not merely as the disclosure of information, but as a core governance function that underpins effective communication, meaningful public engagement and robust accountability arrangements. The analysis combines theory with comparative evidence from a structured questionnaire answered by 30 institutions in EU Member States and five institutions from non-EU jurisdictions. The questionnaire covered legal frameworks, internal arrangements, communication practices, access to information, participation mechanisms and accountability relationships. The findings show that transparency is increasingly more than a legal obligation to publish information. Most participating institutions go beyond minimum legal requirements by publishing additional material, using digital channels, adapting messages to different audiences, supporting financial literacy and creating opportunities for public engagement. At the same time, accountability is shown to operate through a multilayered set of relationships, including reporting duties, parliamentary and audit oversight, review and complaint mechanisms, public explanation and feedback channels that connect institutions both to formal oversight bodies and to society. The study also identifies areas where progress remains uneven, including the evaluation of transparency after publication, the measurement of communication effectiveness, and the transparency of processes supported by artificial intelligence. It concludes that transparency and accountability can drive institutional change when they are embedded in strategy, communication, internal governance, oversight and evaluation. The paper proposes a framework of good practices and a maturity index to help institutions move from compliance-driven transparency towards a more trust-based, evaluative and citizen-oriented approach to accountability, while preserving their independence.

Keywords: central banks; financial supervisory authorities; transparency; accountability; institutional independence; communication; public information; citizen participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 E58 G28 H11 H83 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 169 pages
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:opaper:2617e

DOI: 10.53479/44345

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