Why Did the Banks Overbid? An Empirical Model of the Fixed Rate Tenders of the European Central Bank

Juan Ayuso () and Rafael Repullo
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Juan Ayuso: Banco de España

No 105, Working Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: This paper tests two hypotheses for the overbidding behavior of the banks in the fixed rate tenders conducted by the European Central Bank from January 1999 until June 2000. One hypothesis attributes the overbidding to expectations of a future tightening of monetary policy, while the other attributes it to the liquidity allotment decisions of the ECB.

Keywords: central banks; monetary policy; expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaci ... o/01/Fic/dt0105e.pdf First version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why did the banks overbid? An empirical model of the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (2001)
Working Paper: Why Did the Banks Overbid? An Empirical Model of the Fixed Rate Tenders of the European Cental Bank (2001)
Working Paper: Why Did the Banks Overbid? An Empirical Model of the Fixed Rate Tenders of the European Cental Bank (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:wpaper:0105

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