An Organizational Theory of Unionization

Anja Prummer and Francesco Squintani

No 56, Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers from Berlin School of Economics

Abstract: Motivated by the recent surge in union drives, we present a theoretical model of the factors that influence unionization. An employee seeking to unionize their workplace assembles organizers to persuade coworkers to vote in favor. If unionization benefits workers, it is more likely to succeed when the organizers are credible. Credibility depends on the organizers not being overly biased and/or bearing significant organizational costs. Our theory explains why grassroots movements, rather than established unions, often succeed in organizing workplaces. Interestingly, the likelihood of successful unionization, when it benefits workers, is non-monotonic with respect to organizational costs. When such costs are low, a firm that opposes unionization and targets organizers may paradoxically increase the chances of success. However, the unionization drive is ineffective if the firm’s opposition is sufficiently strong, as this makes organizational costs prohibitive.

Keywords: Unions; Labor Organization; Campaigns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2024-12-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0056

DOI: 10.48462/opus4-5675

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