Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains

Andrés Carvajal

Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica de Colombia

Abstract: This paper studies the falsiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavoir, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but non-trivial, requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypotesis is falsifiable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restrictions. An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by observed data. Without further specif assumptions, there do not exist harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be sufficient.Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be cooperating so as to attain Pareto-efficient outcomes is impossible, as this behavior is in itself unfalsifiable with finite data sets. Imposing aggregation, or strategic complementary and/or substitutability, if theoretically plausible, may provide for a harsher test.

Keywords: Game theory; testable restrictions; revealed preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://doi.org/10.32468/be.229 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains (2004)
Working Paper: Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdr:borrec:229

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