Double defaults: Behavioral regulation of cocaine

Jim Leitzel ()
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Jim Leitzel: University of Chicago

Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 2021, vol. 5, issue 1, 7-12

Abstract: Public policy towards some potentially addictive drugs such as cocaine and opium is highly coercive and punitive, even though the direct harms associated with these drugs generally fall upon the users themselves. Behavioral research has identified non-coercive methods to guide decision making, including the judicious selection of default settings. This paper suggests replacing drug prohibition with a regulated system that involves two levels of defaults for adult drug consumers. The defaults are designed to guide people towards abstinence, or, for the non-abstinent, into moderate drug consumption.

Keywords: drugs; defaults; addiction; choice architecture; nudges (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D90 I18 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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