Europäischer Verbraucherschutz – Ausdruck grenzenloser Regulierungswut oder sinnvoller Schutz für Käufer? Erkenntnisse aus einem Laborexperiment

Roland Kirstein and Annette Kirstein

No 2006-1-1160, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: The paper uses the results of a lemons market experiment to derive economic policy implications regarding the EU regulation on consumer protection. The two lemons market designs tested in the experiment differed with respect to the risk of purchasing bad quality which the uninformed consumers had to bear. In the high-risk market, but not in the low-risk market, consumers have suffered expected losses. This empirical result may justify a paternalistic regulation that makes warranties mandatory.

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