Group Beliefs

Benjamin Brooks () and Songzi Du ()
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Benjamin Brooks: Department of Economics, University of Chicago
Songzi Du: Department of Economics, University of California—San Diego

No 2026-127, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: We extend the frameworks of Harsanyi (1967) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) to study the higher-order beliefs that groups of individuals obtain by pooling their information. A universal group type space is constructed, which contains all of the belief hierarchies that could be held by any group of players in any type space. This formalism is used to study group belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria; this is shown to be the minimal solution concept that only depends on group belief hierarchies and contains all Bayes Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Bayes correlated equilibrium; belief invariance; information design; robust predictions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2026-09-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-127

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