EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Household Preferences for Women’s Employment: A Field Experiment in Bangladesh

Yueh-ya Hsu (), Reshmaan N. Hussam (), Erin M. Kelley () and Gregory Lane ()
Additional contact information
Yueh-ya Hsu: University of Chicago
Reshmaan N. Hussam: Harvard University, Harvard Business School and NBER
Erin M. Kelley: University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy and NBER
Gregory Lane: University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy and NBER

No 2026-41, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates household preferences over who should work and whether these preferences are malleable. We document that men and women prefer that husbands work over wives. To understand why, we randomly assign a six-week job to either the husband or wife and document asymmetry: women’s work improves their own wellbeing but not their husbands’, while men's work improves both partners’ wellbeing. One year later, we surprise households with a work opportunity. Both women and men in households where women were previously employed are more likely to prefer the woman take the job and express fewer concerns about women's employment in general.

JEL-codes: D91 I31 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 83 pages
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_2026-41.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-41

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toni Shears ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2026-07-08
Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-41