Physician Competition: Entry and Substitution
Joshua D. Gottlieb () and
Sean Nicholson ()
Additional contact information
Joshua D. Gottlieb: University of Chicago
Sean Nicholson: Cornell University
No 2026-48, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics
Abstract:
We describe competition in the physician market, focusing on how entry barriers and substitution possibilities have changed in recent decades. Regulatory caps on medical school seats and residency slots—especially for high-paying specialties—continue to ration entry, generate high returns for those who gain these slots, and direct the most academically accomplished trainees toward lucrative fields. But trained physicians increasingly compete with nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and other mid-level practitioners in the market for patients. Training of these substitutes has expanded far more rapidly than physician supply. We present key facts about the physician pipeline, a conceptual framework linking specialty earnings to entry barriers, and describe the rise of mid-level providers. These facts mean that effective competition policy in physician markets must look beyond conventional concentration measures and focus on the institutions and laws that govern who can provide medical care. Length: 35 pages
JEL-codes: I11 J44 L13 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_2026-48.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-48
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toni Shears ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).