Rents, Rules or Revolution: A Survey of Institutional Pathways to Peace

Hannes Mueller and Laura Mayoral

No 1511, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper reviews the growing literature on the relationship between institutions—political, administrative, and economic—and the emergence and prevention of armed conflict. We synthesize evidence showing how strong, inclusive, and accountable institutions, including democratic governance and robust state capacity, can reduce the risk of conflict through multiple mechanisms such as inclusion, deterrence, credible commitment, and the effective provision of public goods. At the same time, we examine how conflict can erode institutional quality, creating self-reinforcing cycles of fragility and underdevelopment. The review concludes with a set of policy recommendations aimed at breaking these cycles and outlines a forward- looking research agenda to deepen our understanding of how institutional reform can foster peace and resilience in fragile and conflict-prone settings.

Keywords: conflict; democracy; economic institutions; political institutions; public services; state capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 O43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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