On the Impossibility of Stability-Based Equilibria in Infinite Horizon: An Example

Malachy James Gavan and Alexander Frug

No 1536, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that stability-based equilibrium refinements may not be well defined when taken to the infinite horizon. To do so, we use a stable-set-style notion of the dynamically consistent partition, allowing for incomplete information. We provide a concrete example where, only via taking the game to the infinite horizon, the dynamically consistent partition of equilibria does not exist.

Keywords: dynamic learning and communication; revision-proof equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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