The Unintended Consequences of Post-Disaster Policies for Spatial Sorting

Eunjee Kwon, Marcel Henkel and Pierre Magontier

No 1566, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We document that U.S. hurricanes striking close to Election Day trigger larger public spending responses and sustained population inflows than comparable hurricanes occurring between elections. Exploiting quasi-random variation in hurricane timing, we show that electoral incentives shape post- disaster policy with lasting spatial consequences. A quantitative spatial equilibrium model implies that eliminating these electoral timing distortions would raise aggregate welfare by 0.025%, but the aggregate gain masks an 18:1 asymmetry in per-capita stakes between losers and gainers. This distributional asymmetry rationalizes the persistence of these electoral distortions.

Keywords: natural disasters; political budget cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H53 H84 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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