Uncertain Participation

Péter Bayer and Mánuel László Mágó

No 1590, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce participation uncertainty to the theory of cooperative TU- games. Under participation uncertainty, each coalition's effective value is an expected value taken over the (full) value of its subsets. We identify 'constant-marginal' participation as a key property for various economic problems to be well-behaved. This class of uncertainty environments is closed for mixing and composition. Under this property, solution concepts are easily calculated, two-sided markets clear and are insurable, and voting power under uncertain participation can be characterized and efficiently computed.

Keywords: cooperative games; matching market; overselling; participation uncertainty; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
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