Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers

Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs and Caio Lorecchio

No 1598, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose valuations are privately known and correlated, so that one buyer 's purchase reveals information about the valuations of others. Without seller commitment, these information spillovers alter future pricing incentives and feed back into current demand. We show that they generate strategic complementarities in buyers' purchase decisions, making demand non-monotone and giving rise to equilibrium multiplicity. Information spillovers can either strengthen or weaken the seller 's effective commitment power, implying that seller revenue, buyer surplus, and total welfare are generically non-monotonic in the strength of spillovers. We characterize when these spillovers encourage data investment and experimentation, as well as facilitate coordination that mitigates hold-up.

Keywords: commitment; dynamic monopoly pricing; equilibrium multiplicity; information spillovers; strategic complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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