Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martínez-Giralt
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Xavier Martinez-Giralt

No 170, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the coexistence of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis-Ã -vis the private provider, under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector.

Keywords: negotiation; health care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care (2005)
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