A Canonical Representation for the Assignment Game: the Kernel and the Nucleolus

Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels

No 279, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The core of an assignment market is the translation, by the vector of minimum core payoffs, of the core of another better positioned market, the matrix of which has the properties of being dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal. This new matrix is defined as the canonical form of the original assignment situation, and it is uniquely characterized by these three properties. The behavior of some well-known cooperative solutions in relation with the canonical form is analyzed. The kernel and the nucleolus of the assignment game, are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of the canonical representative by the vector of minimal core payoffs.

Keywords: assignment game; core; kernel; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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