The Aggregate-Monotonic Core

Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels and Stef Tijs

No 280, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The main objective of the paper is to study the locus of all core selection and aggregate monotonic point solutions of a TU-game: the aggregate-monotonic core. Furthermore, we characterize the class of games for which the core and the aggregate-monotonic core coincide. Finally, we introduce a new family of rules for TU-games which satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity.

Keywords: cooperative game theory; core; aggregate monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
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