Leadership in Collective Action

Esther Hauk and Joan Esteban ()

No 362, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specifific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefifits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefifits – a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Keywords: incentives; Leadership; collective contests; group platform; sharing rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/1362-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Leadership in Collective Action (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:362

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().