The Outcome of Competitive Equilibrium Rules In Buyer-seller Markets When the Agents Play Strategically

Marilda Sotomayor () and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 877, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the two-stage games induced by competitive equilibrium rules for the buyer-seller market of Shapley and Shubik (1972). In these procedures, first sellers and then buyers report their valuation and the outcome is determined by a competitive equilibrium outcome for the market reported by the agents. We provide results concerning buyers and sellers' equilibrium strategies. In particular, our results point out that, by playing first, sellers are able to instigate an outcome that corresponds to the sellers' optimal competitive equilibrium allocation for the true market.

Keywords: assignment game; competitive price; optimal matching; competitive rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically (2017)
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