RELATIVE AMBITION AND THE ROLE OF WAGE SECRECY IN LABOR CONTRACTS

Tomer Blumkin () and David Lagziel
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Tomer Blumkin: BGU

No 1902, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Keywords: secrecy; wages; relative wage; labor contracts; wage compression; wage dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E24 J30 J31 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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