Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures

Claus-Jochen Haake
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Claus-Jochen Haake: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 359, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.

Keywords: Perles-Maschler solution; Object division; Market procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01-19
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