Stable governments and the semistrict core

Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake
Additional contact information
Dinko Dimitrov: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Claus-Jochen Haake: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 378, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.

Keywords: Winning coalitions; Semistrict core; Simple games; Coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315530/2319809 First Version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:378

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().