On core stability and extendability

Evan Shellshear
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Evan Shellshear: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 387, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.

Keywords: Extendability; Core stability; Stable core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315670/2319832 First Version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:387

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