A value for cephoidal NTU-games

Joachim Rosenmüller
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Joachim Rosenmüller: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 388, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: A cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.

Keywords: NTU games; Bargaining solution; Cephoids; Bargaining theory; NTU value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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