A note on apportionment methods

Evan Shellshear
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Evan Shellshear: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 391, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given.

Keywords: Apportionment methods; Simple games; Winning coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315725/2319840 First Version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:391

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