Restricted Dominant Unanimity and Social Discounting

Bach Dong-Xuan and Xiangyu Qu
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Bach Dong-Xuan: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Xiangyu Qu: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 697, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We introduce several principles related to Dominant Unanimity, which enable non- dictatorial social discounting, and we characterize different ranges of social discount factors based on individual one-period discount factors. Our findings suggest that societies adhering to these principles exhibit varying degrees of patience and different ranges of social discounting. This approach provides theoretical pathways to enhance the consideration of distant future welfare, particularly in the context of long-term economic activities and policies.

Pages: 23
Date: 2024-11-12
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2994214/2994215 First Version, 2024 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:697

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