Luck in the Marketplace: Auspicious Timing and Financial Decision-Making

Ge Gao, Carlo Perroni, Oleksandr Talavera () and Linh Vi
Additional contact information
Ge Gao: Beijing Sport University
Carlo Perroni: University of Warwick
Oleksandr Talavera: University of Birmingham
Linh Vi: Aston University

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We study the role of superstition in China's peer-to-peer lending market by examining whether lenders time their bids according to ''lucky hours'' from the Chinese farmer's calendar. Loans funded during lucky hours perform better - but only because the platform lists higher-rated loans at those times. This pattern is consistent with a screening mechanism: highly risk-averse lenders place greater value on both true risk reductions and auspicious-day signals, so the platform maximizes surplus by bundling the two—listing low-risk loans on auspicious days. Moreover, listing safer loans at lucky hours can further boost profits because biased beliefs decay more slowly under asymmetric (bad-news-heavy) learning.

Keywords: Temperature; Peer-to-peer lending, Superstition, Financial platforms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 G23 G41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2026-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:26-02

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