Static Stability in Games

Igal Milchtaich ()
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Igal Milchtaich: Bar Ilan University

No 2008-04, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior. Examples of static notions of stability include evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS), both of which are meaningful or justifiable only for particular classes of games, namely, symmetric multilinear games or symmetric games with a unidimensional strategy space, respectively. This paper presents a general notion of local static stability, of which the above two are essentially special cases. It is applicable to virtually all n-person strategic games, both symmetric and asymmetric, with non-discrete strategy spaces.

Keywords: Stability of equilibrium; static stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
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