 Appointed Elites in the Political Parties – Albania CaseAnjeza Xhaferaj Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2013, vol. 2 Abstract: The paper aimes at exploring the relationships that exist between party structure, party system, patronage and the appointments of the political elites. It is focused on the extent to which political parties can control the allocation of jobs as well as find out which are the institutions over whom the political parties can exercise power; the extent to which historical legacies influence patronage patterns; the extent to which party patronage is exercised in a ‘majoritarian’ as opposed to a more ‘consensual’ manner across the spectrum of political parties; and the relationship that exist between the structure of the party, the appointment of political elites and patronage. The conclusion is that the party in public office and its allies in the coalition cabinet control the post of ministers and vice-ministers. While this last ones control the posts of their subordinates, it is hard to understand whether they select the employees from the party pool or from their personal networks. The other finding is that the structure of the party creates strong links between patronage and appointment, these last ones done with the scope of having control over government resources and distribution of resources. On the other hand the research didn’t prove any link between historical legacies and patronage and party system and patronage. Date: 2013 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bjz:ajisjr:164 DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2013.v2n3p307 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies from Richtmann Publishing Ltd |
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