Disclosure regulation and incentive uncertainty

Phillip C. Stocken

Accounting and Finance, 2022, vol. 62, issue 2, 2267-2281

Abstract: This discussion provides a framework incorporating key forces at play when regulating disclosure in financial market settings. Given the potential for politically costly implementation and legal challenges of regulations aimed at reducing investor uncertainty about a firm or information intermediaries incentives, the question arises whether enhanced information about the incentives of manager and information intermediaries is likely to yield disclosure that is more transparent. This discussion focuses on how the efficient regulation of information providers depends critically on the generic properties of the type of information that they communicate to investors and investor uncertainty about the interests of the information provider.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12862

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:62:y:2022:i:2:p:2267-2281

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