Do Family Firms’ Specific Governance Mechanisms Moderate the Cost of Debt?

Antonio Duréndez, Antonia Madrid‐Guijarro and Ginés Hernández‐Cánovas

Australian Accounting Review, 2019, vol. 29, issue 1, 49-63

Abstract: This study considers whether the specific governance mechanisms of Spanish family firms decrease their debt cost. We explore the idea of reducing debt costs through specific governance mechanisms of family firms, such as the business succession plan, the family council, as well as other traditional mechanisms like the board of directors. Because most corporate governance research has focused on larger firms, more research on smaller privately held family firms is necessary. For this empirical research, we used a sample of 281 small and medium‐sized family firms. The results show that the implementation of a business succession plan not only serves to solve family conflicts and to plan the business succession but also moderates the cost of financing. Our results confirm that credit institutions receive a positive signal when family firms implement business succession plans as governance mechanisms, reducing both family opportunism and asymmetries of information, influencing risk analysts in their decision‐making processes.

Date: 2019
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