Wage Incentives in Labour-Managed and Profit Maximising Firms

Robert Drago and Geoffrey K Turnbull

Australian Economic Papers, 1992, vol. 31, issue 59, 311-24

Abstract: The paper analyzes wage incentives in labor-managed (LMF) and profit maximizing (PMF) firms, considering competitive, individualized, and collective incentives. Partially collective incentives are optimal for LMFs unless workers strike binding effort-matching agreements, which imply the optimality of purely collective incentives. The PMF uses incentives that are less collective than workers would prefer. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University of South Australia

Date: 1992
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