WHEN ARE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS VOLUNTARY? A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH

Kenji Fujiwara ()

Australian Economic Papers, 2010, vol. 49, issue 2, 101-110

Abstract: We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open‐loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting firm, i.e. it is involuntary under a non‐linear feedback strategy. Moreover, we prove an extended proposition of Dockner and Haug (1991) on voluntariness of VERs under a linear feedback strategy.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.2010.00390.x

Related works:
Working Paper: When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary?: A Differential Game Approach (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:49:y:2010:i:2:p:101-110

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0004-900X

Access Statistics for this article

Australian Economic Papers is currently edited by Daniel Leonard

More articles in Australian Economic Papers from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().