Strategic non‐use of the government's precommitment ability for emissions taxation: Environmental R&D formation in a Cournot duopoly

Yasunori Ouchida and Daisaku Goto

Australian Economic Papers, 2022, vol. 61, issue 1, 181-206

Abstract: The primary focus of this paper is to examine the link between environmental R&D formation and the strategic use or non‐use of a government's ability to precommit to an emissions tax rate. The existing literature implicitly omits this important matter. This paper comprehensively evaluates various regulatory contexts separated by the timing of emissions taxation and by environmental R&D formations in a Cournot duopoly. The following three points are revealed. First, an equilibrium occurs in which the government does not strategically use its emissions tax rate precommitment ability to enhance social efficiency. Second, if the efficiency of environmental R&D costs is high and if environmental damage is serious, then the government should precommit to an emissions tax rate and allow for the cartelization of the two firms' environmental R&D. However, if the environmental R&D cost efficiency and environmental damage are both low, then the government should adopt a time‐consistent emissions tax and allow for the cartelization of the two firms' environmental R&D. Third, when the two firms can form an environmental research joint venture (ERJV), ERJV cartelization should be invariably allowed, even if the government is a strategic non‐user of its precommitment ability.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12243

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:61:y:2022:i:1:p:181-206

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0004-900X

Access Statistics for this article

Australian Economic Papers is currently edited by Daniel Leonard

More articles in Australian Economic Papers from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().