Shareholders of the World United? Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France

Paul Bridgen and Marek Naczyk

British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2019, vol. 57, issue 3, 651-675

Abstract: This article considers whether organized labour's engagement with shareholder activism represents a shift in unions’ traditional stakeholder preferences on corporate governance under pension fund capitalism. It does so in light of recent critiques of the class power thesis of corporate governance which suggest greater fluidity and fragmentation in labour's approach. Adopting a diverse case study strategy to compare organized labour's actions in the United States, United Kingdom and France, the article explains these activities as innovative strategies, similar to other revitalization initiatives, designed to advance traditional agendas by alternative means. The article thus concludes that, while organized labour's shareholder activism is unexpected under the class power thesis, its core preferences remain largely unchanged.

Date: 2019
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