Economics of Bail Setting

Boon Lim and Euston Quah

Bulletin of Economic Research, 1998, vol. 50, issue 3, 257-64

Abstract: This paper derives the bail bond that serves as an effective tool in securing a defendant's attendance at trial. It is shown that it is possible for a moderate bail to be set even for suspected capital offenses. The two important determinants in the granting of bail and in the setting of its amount are the defendant's expected cost of punishment and the probability of reapprehension if the suspect jumps bail. The theoretical results are then shown to be consistent with actual case laws. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 1998
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