OPTIONS IN THE DESIGN OF COMPETITIVE‐BIDDING PROCESSES FOR INDIGENT MEDICAL CARE

Jon B. Christianson and Kenneth R. Smith

Contemporary Economic Policy, 1984, vol. 3, issue 2, 55-68

Abstract: This paper discusses competitive‐bidding systems for indigent medical care. Theoretical and empirical research which applies to the specific characteristics of these systems is limited. In particular, it is not clear which set of bidding rules would result in the lowest program costs for the state. Effectively implementing competitive bidding is difficult, given the ambiguity of available research results, since such bidding creates the appearance that policymakers have relinquished budgetary control.

Date: 1984
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