THE AGENCY OF POLITICS AND SCIENCE

Anke Gerber, Corina Haita‐Falah and Andreas Lange

Economic Inquiry, 2018, vol. 56, issue 3, 1543-1561

Abstract: We study a principal‐agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician has some ideal policy that he would like to implement, but needs to contract with a researcher to choose a policy that is supported by scientific advice. We study the implemented contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about the researcher's ability and concern for reputation, and discuss with which types of researchers the politician will contract. We identify several conflicts between the interests of voters and those of the politician. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

Date: 2018
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